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Abstract 
Monitoring mechanisms are tools for companies to protect the interests of the shareholders, most especially, the 
minority shareholders from the deviant behaviour of the management and board members. This study examines 
the relationship between monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal and external auditing), gender and 
information system structure in Nigerian non-financial listed companies. The empirical tests for the study are by 
quantitative analysis approach with data from annual reports and questionnaires (for information system 
structure and internal auditing not obtainable from annual reports). The findings reveal that both gender and 
information system structure significantly relates to monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal auditing and 
external auditing). This empirical study adds to the literature on the antecedents of organizational attributes in 
respect of gender and information system structure as related to monitoring mechanisms, particularly in 
Sub-Saharan African. Likewise, the findings suggest policy implication for the board of directors regarding 
appropriate board composition and structuring of the information system of a company to mitigate agency 
problems. 
Keywords: directorship, external auditing, gender, information system structure, internal auditing, monitoring 
mechanisms 
1. Introduction 
Monitoring mechanisms (MMs) have attained high recognition in corporate governance as critical factors to 
meet the desires of policy-makers, economy regulators, investors, and company owners to certify the security of 
shareholders’ interests in public and private companies. MMs are receiving top attention in companies and the 
business world at large because of their ability to serve as tools to monitor agency costs (Ibrahim & Samad, 
2011). Also, MMs help to guard the interests of the shareholders, especially the minority shareholders from the 
unscrupulous behaviour of the management and board members (Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010). 
Likewise, MMs help to ensure the reliability and quality of financial reporting (R. C. Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 
2004). MMs help to ensure that management and board of directors act in the interest of the shareholders (Tosi, 
Katz, & Gomez-mejia, 1997).  
The demand for monitoring mechanisms (MMs) heightens with the advent of global financial scandals (Barac & 
Coetzee, 2012). Investors expect the management and board of directors of their companies to maximize their 
wealth (Myers, 1977). However, this expectation is being crushed as evidenced in incessant business failures, 
bankruptcies, mergers and lack of transparency in financial reporting of many companies (Bae, Baek, Kang, & 
Liu, 2012). This incident, therefore, brings to limelight the necessity for monitoring mechanisms as each of the 
incidence serves as a pointer to monitoring failure (Kuschnik, 2008) and corruption (TI, 2015). 
The past two decades have witnessed some modifications, development and review of the code of corporate 
governance (Jo & Harjoto, 2011). Examples of such reformation are: the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed in 2002 at 
U.S after the Enron saga (Li, Peters, Richardson, & Watson, 2012); Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(Hashim & Devi, 2008); International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and Nigerian Code of Corporate 
Governance by Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2011). Governments passed these 
reformation and codes of corporate governance to (1) control management’s opportunistic attitudes (He & Ho, 
2010). (2) build investors' trusts and confidence in management and boards of directors (Cadbury, 1992). (3) 
harmonize procedures, accounting policies, and regulations for global financial reporting. 
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Nigeria is a country in the Sub-Saharan Africa with a population of 178.5million people (2014 World Population 
Review) as at the year 2014 and ethnic tribes of about 250 (Curry, 2014). Nigerian's rating in the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (TI, 2003-2014) over years and World Bank's Doing Business Report in The Guardian of 27 
October 2015 explain the frequency of corruption and monitoring failures in Nigerian companies and parastatals. 
The recognition of this fact led to the determination to strengthen the capital market in consideration of the 
contribution of the capital market to the economy of the nation (SEC, 2011). Hence, the approval of 2011 SEC 
Code to replace the 2003 SEC Code (SEC, 2011). The country aims at being one of the 20 top economies in the 
world come the year 2020 (Fodio, Ibikunle, & Oba, 2013). Further to this is the approval of other regulations 
such as the Financial Reporting Council Act, 2011 and review of 1990 CAMA in 2004. However, all these 
reformation coupled with the achievement as the giant of Africa (Adebayo & Adetayo, 2014) notwithstanding, 
the poor performance evidenced in the level of poverty, unemployment that culminates into corruption persist. 
Corruption and improper record keeping are rendering the implementation of the good laws that makes for good 
corporate governance very difficult (Adegbite, 2012). This study expects that monitoring mechanisms will help 
to resolve agency problems and reduce information asymmetry existing between management and shareholders. 
It, therefore, empirically considers two antecedents of organizational attributes in relation to monitoring 
mechanisms. The antecedents of organizational attributes to consider are gender and information system 
structure. The study examines monitoring mechanisms in the light of the directorship, internal auditing, and 
external auditing. Agency theory will be used to explain the relationship between gender, information system 
structure and monitoring mechanisms. 
There is a dearth of research on the extent of impacts of gender and information system structure in respect of 
monitoring mechanisms as a combination of directorship, internal and external auditing. There are literature on 
antecedents of organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms. These are mostly in developed and 
transiting nations like U.S, U.K, and Malaysia. The literature are very scanty in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mustapha 
& Che-Ahmad, 2011; D. Anderson, Francis, & Stokes, 1993; Aguilera, Cuervo-Cazurra, & Kim, 2009; Sarens & 
Abdolmohammadi, 2011; Adeyemi, Okpala, & Dabor, 2012). With exception of two literature, each of the 
literature tests either one or two (Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001; Marra, Mazzola, & Prencipe, 2011) of the 
monitoring mechanisms. The only two literature that combined the three dimensions of monitoring mechanisms 
(directorship, internal and external auditing) are Anderson et al. (1993) and Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2009). 
However, to the best of the knowledge of the researchers, the only literature that tests the impact of information 
system structure on monitoring mechanisms is Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2009). There is none yet on gender 
and monitoring mechanisms. 
This study will, therefore, extend the work of Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2009) by introducing gender to the 
model. Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2009), test information system structure in relation to monitoring 
mechanisms in Malaysian listed companies. 
There is a need for more research on monitoring mechanisms considering the dearth of research on gender as 
related to the board of directors' composition, information system structure, and monitoring mechanisms in 
sub-Saharan countries, which includes Nigeria. The recent adoption of the International Financial Reporting 
System and review of the Code of Corporate Governance also necessitates investigation of the antecedents of 
organizational attributes and monitoring mechanisms. 
This paper, therefore, establishes the impact of gender (as a component of the composition of the board of 
directors), and information system structure of the listed companies on the agency problems between the 
management and the investors. The findings of the study are useful to the management, board of directors, 
internal and external auditors, regulatory agents, government, shareholders and the general public. 
The next section of this paper is on literature review and hypotheses development. Next to this is the section that 
discusses methodology, describing research design and process of data collection. Lastly is the section for 
discussion of results and conclusion of the study. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Underpinning Theories 
Fama (1980) explores agency problems and the theory of the firm. The study opines that agency theory is 
concerned with the need to separate ownership from control to stipulate agency monitoring. The study further 
opines that the monitoring mechanisms, which the separation specifies allow for efficiency in the company. 
Jensen and Smith (1985) review the relationship between stockholder, manager, and creditor interests, applying 
the agency theory framework. The study maintains that agency theory is useful to evaluate contractual provisions 
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purposed to monitor the bond between the management and shareholders. The study also reveals that agency 
theory helps to control the conflicts of interest between the two parties. Many literature examine organizational 
attributes and monitoring mechanisms in the context of agency theory (Liu, 2012, Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 
2013). This paper, therefore, examines how female board directors and the structuring of information systems 
help the shareholders to monitor the agents (management). 
Gibson (2000) examines the moral basis of stakeholders' theory. The study reports that in stakeholders' theory, 
the managers are fiducially responsible to stakeholders. It further opines that each stakeholder has a claim on the 
company and for no reason should become a means to an end. It also suggests that such stakeholders should be 
given the chance to participate in making decisions, directing the future of the company. Freeman and Phillips 
(2002) examine stakeholder theory as a libertarian defence. The study suggests that the relationship of 
management with the groups, whose action can affect the purpose of the existence of a company, determines the 
company's ability to maximize the wealth of the shareholders. Some of the existing literature that used 
stakeholder theory as the basis of their investigation are Knox and Gruar, (2007); Cai, Jo, and Pan (2012). This 
paper, therefore, examines how female board directors and the structuring of information systems help to ensure 
that decision makers consider the interests of all stakeholders in making decisions especially as it affects 
shareholders’ wealth maximization. 
The study of Spence (1973) on job market signaling, documents that signaling theory is about the symbols that 
decision makers are using to resolve information asymmetry. These symbols should be obvious and also dear to 
mimic (Ross, 1977). Aly and Simon (2009), investigate the determinants of corporate internet reporting. The 
study suggests that companies with a high degree of good performance are likely to divulge information in order 
to signal its profitability to investors (Oyeler, Lasad, & Fisher, 2003). The study of Oyeler et al. (2003), reports 
that the company will be so much transparent regarding its profit in order to earn shareholders’ support for the 
continuation of positions and compensation for the management. There are extant literature that use signaling 
theory such as Okhmatovskiy and David (2011); Aly and Simon (2009). This paper, therefore, examines the 
symbolic implication of female board directors and information system structure. 
2.2 Monitoring Mechanisms 
Prior literature suggests various internal and external monitoring mechanisms (MMs) with steps being taken 
from time to time to improve the MMs (Fama, 1980; Anderson et al., 1993; Sarens, De Beelde, & Everaert, 2009; 
Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011a;). The cause of the suggestions and improvement actions is due to incessant 
business failures, bankruptcies, mergers and lack of transparency in financial reporting of many companies (Bae 
et al., 2012), since the advent of shocks of the 1820s, 1870s, 1970s, 2007, and the great depression of 1930s 
(Shaikh, 2011). These incidence led to shareholders losing their confidence in the true position of financial 
statements from the managements and board of committees of the listed companies (Cadbury, 1992; Liu, 2012). 
It is necessary to check the opportunistic attitudes responsible for these incidence (He & Ho, 2010), hence the 
review of policies, regulations and laws for necessary monitoring to curb the agency problems and information 
asymmetry (Okpala, 2012). 
Aguilera et al. (2009), examine codes of good governance worldwide. The study reports that firms in the 
developed and transiting countries voluntarily adopt codes of corporate governance. However, the insufficient 
monitoring role of market, barriers from weak institutional systems and unclear links to the performance of firms 
persist. It further reports that the enforcement level of the codes of governance is a reflection of country specifics 
such as culture, institutional settings, politics and national economy. Barac and Coetzee (2012), investigate the 
effect of internal audit function and demand for internal auditing. The study documents that the need to restore 
the confidence of the investors and ensure transparency and accountability in companies requires the 
strengthening of regulatory frameworks. It further claims that effective monitoring mechanisms are required to 
strengthen the regulatory frameworks and improve the structures of corporate governance. The study of 
Anderson et al. (1993), on auditing, directorships and the demand for monitoring find that the effectiveness of 
this set of monitoring mechanisms depends on the company's mix and growth of assets. 
2.2.1 Directorship 
Anderson et al. (2004), investigate characteristics of the board, integrity of accounting report, and the cost of 
debt. The study documents that boards of directors have tasks to monitor and discipline senior management. 
Hence, the boards are required to render audited accounts to company creditors. Cadbury (1992), report of the 
committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance in U.K in paragraph 1.8 claims that directors have 
the responsibility to monitor, establish controls for the activities of the company and ensure functionality of the 
controls. 
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2.2.2  Internal Auditing 
Barac & Coetzee (2012), in their study on internal audit function and demand for internal auditing find that 
internal auditing (IA) in South Africa helps to monitor risks and evaluates controls in a company. The study 
documents that IA is a keystone of effective corporate governance. It also claims that IA has been receiving 
attention more than ever before the corporate scandals. Sarens and Abdolmohammadi (2011), investigate 
monitoring effects of the internal audit function. The study finds that IA is central to developing an 
accountability relationship between management and audit committee. Thereby, IA helps to resolve some agency 
problems, especially between the committee or board of directors and management. It further reports that an 
effective internal auditing provides audit committees high level of comfort to affect their monitoring 
responsibilities. 
2.2.3  External Auditing 
Anderson et al. (1993) examine auditing, directorships and demand for monitoring. The study finds that external 
auditing (EA) together with the directorships and internal auditing is a part of the set of monitoring mechanisms 
accessible to companies. Chow (2012) investigates the demand for external auditing. The study reports that 
companies engage EA services for many reasons apart from the statutory requirements. It suggests the following 
as some of the reasons for hiring EA: (1) operational efficiency, which is a function of economies of scale in the 
audit market. (2) When the management perceives that the external auditor is not likely to connive with the 
company’s staff and (3) industry characteristics especially as related to the complexity of the firm or industry. 
2.3 Gender 
Bear, Rahman and Post (2010) examine the impact of board diversity and gender composition on corporate 
social responsibilities (CSR), using 689 listed companies. The study argues that female board members 
positively impact the rating for corporate social responsibility, which in turn has a positive impact on the 
reputation of the company. It finds that the presence of females on the board results in raising the CSR and 
corporate reputation. Also, female board members help to allow for critical board processing in terms of analysis 
for decision making. The study of Lenard, Yu, York, and Wu (2014) investigate how board gender diversity 
impacts on firm risk. The study finds that a board with greater female directors associates with less unevenness 
in stock return. However, Bøhren and Staubo (2015), examine mandatory gender balance and independence of 
the board suggests that gender diversity strongly increases the independence of the board but reduces firm value. 
The findings of Ujunwa (2012), collaborates the negative impact of gender diversity on firm value. Ujunwa 
(2012), in his investigation of board characteristics and Nigerian firms' financial performance reveals negative 
relationship between gender diversity and firm performance. There is, therefore, mixed findings on the 
relationship between gender diversity and monitoring mechanisms. 
Agency theory suggests that investors value public firms with independent directors on the board of directors. 
Stakeholder theory, suggests that gender balance relates with increased board independence and needs for 
diverse stakeholders on the board of directors. Signaling theory, suggests the presence of female directors on 
boards of directors as a signal to indicate that a company pays attention to minority shareholders and women. 
This study, therefore, expects that board gender diversity will ensure compliance with policies, code of corporate 
governance, and considers the interest of all stakeholders in decision-making. Therefore, this study considers 
related hypotheses as shown below: 
H1  Female directors positively influence the demand for monitoring mechanisms 
(directorship, internal and external auditing). 
H1i Female directors positively influence the demand for directorship monitoring 
mechanisms 
H1ii Female directors positively influence the demand for internal auditing monitoring 
mechanisms 
H1iii Female directors positively influence the demand for external auditing monitoring 
mechanisms 
2.4 Information System Structure 
Information system structure (ISS) is about the decision of a company to centralize or decentralize its 
information system in terms of operation, development and management (Chervany, 2013). Heo and Han (2003), 
investigate the performance measure of information systems. The study finds that companies with centralized 
ISS focus more on system quality while companies with decentralized ISS have their focus on information 
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quality. The study also finds that companies with centralized cooperative computing consider the organizational 
impact and system quality. The study of Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1997), examine information technology and 
internal firm organization. The study finds that the information technology associates with work system 
including decentralized authority, incentives justifying decreased observability and also increases need of 
competency. Weill and Olson (1989), consider investment in information technology. The study documents that 
organizational culture, implementation process and skill of management influence the effectiveness of the output 
from IT investment. 
The findings of Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1997), regarding decreased observability and need for competent workers 
are a pointer to the need for monitoring mechanisms. It implies that certain monitoring mechanisms are required 
to ensure that the information system is structured to produce quality information (financial and otherwise) for 
decision making. The findings of Weill and Olson (1989), in respect of implementation process of IT and skill of 
management impact on IT output, also points to the link of information system structure (ISS) to monitoring 
mechanisms. There are literature on information system structure (ISS), but with no evidence of any link to 
monitoring mechanisms except by Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2013). 
The three underpinning theories (agency, stakeholders and signalling) recognize the existence of information 
asymmetry between management and shareholders. Management has more information but fails to disclose all to 
the shareholders because of its opportunistic attitude. Following the above discussion, it is expected that 
information system structure (ISS) will be a tool to ensure that the company's IT generates quality financial 
reports that will help the shareholders to have sufficient information for decision making. This study, therefore, 
considers related hypotheses as shown below: 
H2  Information System Structure (ISS) positively influences the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms (directorship, internal and external auditing). 
H2i Information System Structure (ISS) positively influences the demand for directorship as a 
monitoring mechanism. 
H2ii Information System Structure (ISS) positively influences the demand for internal auditing 
as a monitoring mechanism. 
H2iii Information System Structure (ISS) positively influences the demand for external 
auditing as a monitoring mechanism. 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Sample 
The researchers used a quantitative method using data from annual reports and a questionnaire. The study uses 
111 annual reports of Nigerian non-financial listed companies. The study excludes financial listed companies due 
to different legal structure and regulatory framework for the industry. In addition to the annual reports, 
questionnaires were used to solicit data on information system structure and internal auditing. The questionnaire 
answers the question regarding whether or not the administration and control of information systems are 
centralized or decentralized. It also provides answer to the costs of internal auditing. The researchers subjected 
the questionnaire to content validation through seven experts, all of whom are academicians and Ph.D. certificate 
holders from different universities of Nigeria. Information System Structure (ISS) is categorical and sourced by 
the questionnaire. Board gender (BSB) is from the annual reports and it is a continuous variable. The dependent 
variable, monitoring mechanisms (MC) is also continuous. 
The questionnaires were administered to the internal auditor and either the head of accounts or the company 
secretary of each of the non-financial listed companies visited by self and research assistance engaged in 
addition to copies sent by emails to the companies. The data was keyed into Microsoft Excel for further analysis 
in Stata 12. 
3.2 Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
Monitoring mechanisms (MC) is the total costs of monitoring measured as the summation of the costs of 
non-executive directors (NEDIR), internal audit (IAC) and external audit (EAC). The measurement for NEDIR 
is the non-executive directors' remuneration in Nigerian currency, naira (N). IAC is the amount paid to the 
internal auditors in Nigerian currency, naira (N) while EAC is the fees paid to the external auditors in Nigerian 
currency, naira (N). 
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3.3 Independent Variables 
The measurement for the board gender (BSB) is the proportion of female to male directors while that of 
information system structure (ISS) is 1 for centralized ISS and 2 for decentralized ISS. 
Control VariablesThe measurement for the company size (Cz) is total assets; firm performance (ROA) is the 
ratio of profit before interests and tax to total assets while that of company's growth is Tobin's Q = ratio of the 
market value of the company to its total assets. 
3.4 Research Model 
The model for this study is: 















Proportion of female to male directors 




4. Results and Discussion 
The researchers obtained the annual reports from Nigerian Stock Exchange. 332 questionnaires were 
administered in 166 listed companies, one each for the internal auditor, head of accounts or company secretary 
expecting to have at least one response from each company. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
117 (70%) questionnaires were received, but there were no corresponding annual reports for 6. The remaining 
111 (67%) questionnaires were analysed with the relevant annual reports using SPSS 22 for descriptive analysis 
and Stata for the hypotheses testing. The table in the appendix presents the descriptive data from the 
questionnaires. It shows that 80.2% of the respondents are male while the remaining 19.8% are female. 48.6% of 
the respondents are Internal Auditors, 38.7% are Accountants, and 12.6% are the company secretaries. 46.8% of 
them have been with their respective companies for less than 5 years, 36% for 6 to 10 years, 8.1% for 11 to 15 
years, 8.1% for 16 to 20 years and 0.9% for 20 years and above. The working experience of the respondents are 
1-5 years (11.7%), 6-10 years (39.6%), 11-15 years (25.2%), 16-20 years 14.4% and 20 years and above (9%). 
The F-test reveals that the model is statistically significant. The mean values for independent variables range 
from 0.090158 and 1.267267 with a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3. Thus, the result meets the 
basic requirement for multivariate analysis. Only 59% of the listed companies have female directors. The 
information system of 74% of the companies is centralized. 
4.2 Multicollinearity 
Tables 1 and 2 below are the results of the regression model that present collinearity, multicollinearity, variance 
inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance of the study using Stata. Table 1 reveals that the variables are not highly 
correlated with one another. All the correlations values are well below 0.9, hence, likewise, the VIF is below 5 
and tolerance is above 0.2. This study can, therefore, conclude that there is no multicollinearity problem for 
variables that this paper examines. 
 
















Monitoring Costs 1.00      
Female Board Directors 0.19 1.00     
Information System Structure 0.25 0.05 1.00    
Company Size 0.76 0.17 0.16 1.00   
Company Performance 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.21 1.00  
Company Growth 0.08 0.14 -0.04 0.09 0.27 1.00 
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Table 2. Variance inflation factors (VIF) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Female Board Directors 1.05 0.951006 
Information Systems Structure 1.03 0.966504 
Company Size 1.09 0.916495 
Company Performance 1.13 0.887483 
Company Growth 1.1 0.911276 
Mean VIF 1.08 
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
The researchers ran pool, fixed effect and Random effect. However, the researchers had to run panel-corrected 
standard errors (PCSEs) considering its robustness nature (Beck & Katz, 1995) by which the study could correct 
for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Bailey & Katz, 2011). Table 3 presents result from PCSEs explaining 
the relationship between board gender, information system structure and monitoring mechanisms. The result 
suggests that both the board gender (BSB) and information system structure (ISS) as well as the three control 
variables (company size, performance and growth – Cz, FP and GR) are significant predictor variables for 
monitoring mechanisms. The results show that both BSB (b=2.24, z=6.27) and ISS (b=0.85, z=11.3) 
significantly affect monitoring mechanisms (MC) at 1% level using PSCE after logging for company size (Cz). It 
indicates that a unit increase in BSB will yield 2.24-unit increase in the predicted MC. A unit increase in ISS will 
yield 0.85-unit increase in the predicted MC. The three control variables company size (Cz – b=2.14, z=22.32), 
company performance (FP – b=0.82, z=2.12), and company growth (GR - b=-0.02, z=-1.65) are also related to 
monitoring mechanisms. A unit increase in Cz will yield 2.14-unit increase in the predicted monitoring 
mechanisms (MC). A unit increase in FP will yield 0.82-unit increase in the predicted MC. A unit increase in GR 
will yield -0.02-unit decrease in the predicted m MC. However, GR is negatively significantly related to 
monitoring mechanisms. The z-tests further confirm the significance of the relationship as all the results for the 
tests are above the threshold of 1.65. Likewise, the p-values are below 5% for BB, ISS, and Cz at 1%, FP at 5% 
and GR at 10%. 
 
Table 3. Panel data regression results 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Female Board Directors 2.238585 0.357091 6.27 0.000 
Information Systems Structure 0.848644 0.075128 11.3 0.000 
Company Size 2.1354 0.09566 22.32 0.000 
Company Performance 0.816091 0.385263 2.12 0.034 
Company Growth -0.02314 0.014053 -1.65 0.100 
_cons 0.042691 0.154926 0.28 0.783 
 
An increase in the number of female board directors implies increased monitoring costs. The study provides an 
evidence that the more the number of females on the board of directors the more the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms. Hence, the presence of female board directors influences the demand for monitoring mechanisms. 
The result validates Gamba and Goldstein (2009), documentation that "financial measures excel where women 
serve." The study also claims that expectation of women in respect of their responsibilities as directors aids 
board's effectiveness. While some governments are enforcing gender equality on boards (Abdullah, Ismail, & 
Nachum, 2015), Nigerian code of corporate governance only request that gender composition be included as part 
of information on the criteria for the appointment of directors (SEC 2011, Par. 13.2). 
Likewise, information system structure is an important factor in predicting the demand for monitoring 
mechanisms. This is because if the structure is decentralized, it requires more monitoring and possible 
adjustment of work procedures to enhance overall goal of the company. The overall goal of any company is to 
maximize shareholders' wealth. Information system structure is a part of internal control of a company. Hence, 
the findings of Mustapha and Che-Ahmad reveal that companies with centralized information system have 
preference for internal auditing. The findings conform to the rationale for internal audit responsibility for internal 
control, of which information system is a component. Also, most information needed to make decisions that 
aligns the interests of management and shareholders are processed using information systems. The Nigerian code 
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of corporate governance, requests companies to ensure that they integrate into their risk management framework 
the day to day operation of the business that provides guidelines to administer key risks in its technology (SEC 
2011, Par. 29.2b). This is in no doubt showing how important the regulators view information system structure 
regarding monitoring mechanisms and its usefulness in producing transparent financial reports that builds up 
shareholders confidence in the company. 
The study ran similar tests for each dimension of the MC (directorship, internal auditing and external auditing). 
The results are similar to the results for the construction, MC as all the tested variables significantly relates to 
each dimension of MC.  
The p-value of chi-square test statistics proves that the model is significant. 
Overall, the results produce evidence that board gender has a significant impact on monitoring mechanisms in 
the non-financial listed companies in Nigeria because a greater percentage of the companies are with female 
board members. This is in accordance with findings in the extant literature that even with exposure to sensitive 
information or more critical situations; women maintain more balanced proper behavior than men (Horak, 2015). 
By this nature, female board directors can help to align the interests of management and shareholders, thereby 
resolving type I agency problems. Also, female board directors are mostly independent directors (Bøhren & 
Staubo, 2015). Hence, they are likely to ensure none expropriation of the interests of minority shareholders, 
thereby resolving type II agency problems. Likewise, they can help to ensure that the interests of all stakeholders 
are well considered in decision making. 
The results also provide evidence that information system structure has a significant impact on monitoring 
mechanisms. This is due to the fact that its main focus is to ensure proper flow of information for 
decision-making in a company. It is also capable of serving as a tool for monitoring the opportunistic behavior of 
management and board of directors in a company that can afford to invest in and structure information systems 
that allow for monitoring (Eisenhardt, 1989). Its impact on monitoring is recognized to the extent that 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) takes cognizance of it in section 404. SOX Section 404 highlights how 
important it is to control the financial reporting function of management information systems (Li et al., 2012). 
Centralization of information system enables close monitoring of management activities for approval or change 
in work activities (King, 1983). Thus, the study suggests that information system structure is part of the internal 
control that calls for intensive monitoring especially by the internal auditor on a daily basis. 
There are studies on monitoring mechanisms (Dedman, Kausar, & Lennox, 2013; Gerakos, 2013; Dabor, & 
Ibadin, 2013), but none tests the impact of board gender on the three dimensions of monitoring mechanisms in 
one study. Also, only one literature tests the relationship between the information system structure and 
monitoring mechanisms (Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2009). 
5. Conclusion 
This study adds to the literature on relationship between board gender, information system structure (ISS) and 
monitoring mechanisms as extant literature tests the two independent variables in relation with dependent 
variables other than monitoring mechanisms. To the best of the knowledge of the researchers, only one literature 
(Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2009 test ISS in relation to the monitoring mechanisms. The study will be the first for 
Sub-Saharan Africa to test board gender and information system structure with monitoring mechanisms in 
combination of directorship, internal and external auditing. The primary contribution of this study is that board 
female directors and information system structure positively and significantly relate to monitoring mechanisms. 
Likewise, the control variables, company size and performance positively and significantly relate to monitoring 
mechanisms while company growth negatively and significantly relate to monitoring mechanisms. These 
findings have significance implication for the board of directors, internal and external auditors, investors as well 
as regulatory agents with the outlook for strengthening corporate governance of the listed companies. Likewise, 
the academic community should explore more on these variables, especially for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Male 89 80.2 80.2 80.2 
Female 22 19.8 19.8 100.0 
Total 111 100.0 100.0   
Respondents’ Designations 
Valid Internal Auditor 54 48.6 48.6 48.6 
Accountant 43 38.7 38.7 87.4 
Company Secretary 14 12.6 12.6 100.0 
Total 111 100.0 100.0   
Respondents’ Working Experience with the Company 
Valid 1-5 years 52 46.8 46.8 46.8 
6-10 years 40 36.0 36.0 82.9 
11-15 9 8.1 8.1 91.0 
16-20 9 8.1 8.1 99.1 
20 and above 1 .9 .9 100.0 
Total 111 100.0 100.0   
Respondents’ Working Experience 
Valid 1-5 years 13 11.7 11.7 11.7 
6-10 years 44 39.6 39.6 51.4 
11-15 28 25.2 25.2 76.6 
16-20 16 14.4 14.4 91.0 
20 and above 10 9.0 9.0 100.0 
Total 111 100.0 100.0   
Respondents’ Nationality 
Valid Nigerian 108 97.3 97.3 97.3 
Others 3 2.7 2.7 100.0 
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